The noticeability and appearance of these effects is known as aliasing. I am unpersuaded by the arguments my colleagues make against jurisdiction. The Board concluded that the invention is a mathematical algorithm rather than a patentable machine. Any new and useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or 92-1381 composition of matter, including improvements, may thus receive patent protection.
To overcome these effects, Alappats invention employs an anti-aliasing system wherein each vector making up the waveform is represented by modulating the illumination intensity of pixels having center points bounding the trajectory of the vector. Finally, the legislative history of Section 7 does not clearly advance the narrowest interpretation of the Commissioners powers. The refusal of a petition for patent had no appeal. And while I do not necessarily agree with all that is said about it by those in support of jurisdiction, I do agree that there is sufficient basis in law for this court to conclude that we have before us on this record a decision of the Board; I concur in the courts decision to proceed to address the merits. I join Judge Richs opinion holding that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal and reversing the reconstituted Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences decision on the merits. Section 101 (1988), I write to clarify that this conclusion does not hinge on whether Alappats invention is classified as machine or process under section 101. The Board reached this conclusion by impermissibly expanding the scope of the claimed subject matter, thereby running afoul of 35 U. Section 101 explicitly covers both processes and machines.
See In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866, 869, 227 USPQ 1, 3-4 (Fed. The Commissioner thus has the authority to convene an expanded panel which includes, or as in this case is predominately made up of, senior executive officers of the PTO such as the Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioner, the Boards Chairman and Vice-Chairman, and himself. The events surrounding the enactment of the 1927 Act do not indicate that Congress intended to eliminate entirely the great power understood to have been possessed by the Commissioner prior to the act. See In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 159, 191 USPQ 730, 736-37 (CCPA 1976) (Rich, J., dissenting); 1 D. Coexistent with the usage of these terms has been the rule that a person cannot obtain a patent for the discovery of an abstract idea, principle or force, law of nature, or natural phenomenon, but rather must invent or discover a practical application to a useful end. This simple text served the industrial revolution and the atomic age; surely it can serve modern electronics. It is estimated that 85-90% of the worlds technology is disclosed only in patent documents. I do not agree that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. The Patent Act provides that [o]nly the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has the authority to grant rehearings. On one hand, he argues that the board is not an independent body, but is simply an extension of the former power of the Commissioner to The board is an alternative avenue through which the Commissioner may make policy decisions, of which as head of the Patent Office, he is the final arbiter. See, e.g., In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326, 231 USPQ 136, 138 (Fed. 1986) (Our review of a finding of anticipation [a fact question] is the same whether it was made by the board or by a district court.); compare In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833, 15 USPQ2d 1566, 1567 (Fed. 1990) (anticipation is a question of fact for the board reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard), with Lindemann Maschinenfabrik Gmbh v. While the Commissioner has various vehicles at his command for announcing official interpretations of the agencys organic legislation and for enunciating agency policy, there is nothing unusual about using the adjudicative process for that purpose.
Therefore, before addressing the merits, it is appropriate that we first determine that the decision was rendered by a legally constituted panel to ensure that a jurisdictional cloud does not hang over our holding on the merits. Although Alappat does not contest the validity of the Boards reconsideration decision, jurisdiction cannot be conferred on this court by waiver or acquiescence. There is no evidence in the legislative history of Section 7, or Title 35 as a whole, clearly indicating that Congress intended to impose any statutory limitations regarding which Board members the Commissioner may appoint to an expanded panel or when the Commissioner may convene such a panel. The terms used in Section 101 have been used for over two hundred years since the beginnings of American patent law to define the extent of the subject matter of patentable invention. The text of section 101 has not changed since 1793, other than to change the word art to process. I know of no major technological advance, no new industry or evolving technology, that has not participated in the patent system. Mayer, J., with whom Michel, J., joins, dissenting. However, the Solicitor presents conflicting impressions of the board and its role. It is on this assumption that this court has routinely reviewed patentability decisions of the board on the same basis as it does those of a court. The Commissioner had a quite different view of how Section 101 should be interpreted than did the Board that initially heard the case.
(Printed Matter and Computer Software).] Rich, J., with whom: as to Part I (Jurisdiction): Newman, Lourie, and Rader, JJ., join; Archer, C. Larsen (collectively Alappat) appeal the April 22, 1992, reconsideration decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), Ex Parte Alappat, 23 USPQ2d 1340 (BPAI, 1992), which sustained the Examiners rejection of claims 15-19 of application Serial No. We interpret the term rehearings in Section 7 as encompassing any reconsideration by the Board of a decision rendered by one of its panels. 1.197 (PTO Rule 197) We have been unable to find any evidence suggesting that, in promulgating Rule 197, the PTO intended to create a review process separate and distinct from that provided by statute. Section 135 (1988), and issue a patent when authorized by law, 35 U. Even though Board members serve an essential function, they are but examiner-employees of the PTO, and the ultimate authority regarding the granting of patents lies with the Commissioner. In this way, the Senate was able to report that the supervisory power of the Commissioner, as it has existed for a number of decades, remains unchanged. By doing so, this court would not be announcing as does the majority that in all respects it approves the manner by which the rehearing was granted in this case or in another similar case. He says it regularly sits in panels of three, but is capable, as is this court, of sitting in expanded panels if certain criteria are met. The Offices primary task is to answer questions on the patentability of inventions. Judge Schall in his dissent also says no to the question of whether we have before us a decision of the Board. 584, 589 [198 USPQ 193] (1978), two cases in which the Court ruled the inventions non-statutory: [The petitioners] definition is significantly broader than the definition this Court employed in Benson and Flook. Significantly, the Court thereby refused to classify all algorithms as non-statutory subject matter. Section 7(b) are descended directly from section 482 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by the Act of March 2, 1927. In the 1927 statute, the board of appeals having sole power to grant rehearings consisted of [t]he Commissioner of Patents, the first assistant commissioner, the assistant commissioner, and the examiners in chief . While I recognize that it is unwieldy to have it be that only the full membership of the Board can grant rehearings, that is the result which the language of the statute compels.